


































In this paper, the duopolistic manufacturer’s vertical structure selection  under multistage transaction is examined. The result is as follows. 
If  vertical transaction is done by two-part tariff, vertical separation is weakly dominant strategy. The equilibrium is the symmetric type of 
this strategy set, as well as the asymmetric type of other strategy set. The asymmetric equilibrium exists because manufacturer’s vertical 
structure selection has the same effect as move selection in price competition. Therefore, the asymmetric equilibrium appears as the 
Stackelberg equilibrium though  retail price is decided simultaneously. For the same reason, asymmetric equilibrium appears if vertical 
transaction is done by linear pricing. However, it appears only when the product’s homogeneity is somewhat high, because manufacturer 
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        0< γ <0.69β (VS,VS) <(2/3,1/2)< (1/2,2/3)< (VI,VI)
0.69β < γ <0.71β (VS,VS) <(2/3,1/2)< (VI,VI)< (1/2,2/3)
0.71β < γ <0.80β (VS,VS) <(VI,VI)< (2/3,1/2)< (1/2,2/3)
0.80β < γ <0.88β (VI,VI)< (VS,VS) <(2/3,1/2)< (1/2,2/3)
0.88β < γ <0.99β (VI,VI)< (2/3,1/2)< (VS,VS) <(1/2,2/3)
0.99β < γ < β (VI,VI)< (2/3,1/2)< (1/2,2/3)< (VS,VS)
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